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COMMENTS
UPSTREAM, OVERSEAS, AND UNDERWATER: WHEN A FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARY FILES BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
LEGAL STANDARDS CONTROL THE TREATMENT OF AN UPSTREAM
GUARANTY?
I. INTRODUCTION
As corporations become multinational entities, with affiliations
across the globe, international insolvencies turn from speculation
to reality. International insolvencies create special problems for
the bankruptcy court administering an international corporation's
assets.
This Comment will focus on how a U.S. bankruptcy court's
use of U.S. bankruptcy law may impact the foreign creditors of an
insolvent entity. Specifically, a U.S. court's valuation of a guaranty
may result in decisions that are unfair to foreign creditors and
contrary to a foreign country's policies. An additional consider-
ation is whether U.S. courts will recognize a foreign country's laws
in an ancillary proceeding, thus frustrating U.S. bankruptcy policy.
Part II of this Comment outlines a hypothetical situation to
illustrate the issues and problems of applying different laws in
multijurisdictional bankruptcies. Part III discusses general relevant
bankruptcy principles that illustrate how U.S. bankruptcy court
decisions effectuate or frustrate bankruptcy policies of foreign
countries. Specifically, Part III examines the policies of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Part III also discusses
the implications of ancillary proceedings in which bankruptcy
courts determine whether to afford comity to foreign jurisdictions.
Part IV gives an overview of fraudulent transfer law, insolvency,
and guaranty valuation in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada. The specific laws and their differences are used in
Part V to explore the ramifications of a U.S. bankruptcy court's
application of U.S. bankruptcy law when a foreign corporation files
for bankruptcy in the United States.
This Comment concludes that, if U.S. bankruptcy courts
follow another country's laws, the result may be unfair and
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disproportionate when applied to creditors, and unwieldy for
adjudication in U.S. bankruptcy courts.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
This Comment will refer to the following hypothetical
bankruptcy case involving an international corporation for
illustrative purposes:
Pargen, Inc. ("Pargen"), a U.S. corporation, is a holding
corporation1 of several subsidiaries. Finding it expedient to do
genetic testing outside the United States, Pargen established
several subsidiaries in different countries.
Eight months ago, Pargen caused two of its foreign subsidiar-
ies to guaranty' two separate bank loans that Pargen was obtain-
ing from Genbank, Inc. ("Genbank"), a U.S. bank.' This guaran-
1. A holding corporation is "[a) company that usually confines its activities to owning
stock in, and supervising management of, other companies." BLACK'S LAW DICIIONARY
731 (6th ed. 1990). If the holding corporation owns a majority of the shares of the other
company, it is referred to as the parent corporation. Id. at 1114. The company in which
the parent owns stock is called a subsidiary. Id. at 1428. The subsidiaries, however, hold
the tangible assets and cash flow. A lender would want to attach these assets as collateral
against the possibility that the loan may not be repaid.
2. A guaranty is a promise by one entity or person to a lender that it will make
payments on another's debt. Raymer McQuiston, Drafting an Enforceable Guaranty in an
International Financing Transaction: A Lender's Perspective, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
138, 138 (1993). The usual situation is one where the bank (lender) loans money to X (a
corporate borrower), but is unwilling to give the loan based on the financial status of X,
and thus requires further assurance that the debt will be paid. Therefore, Y corporation
(guarantor) promises that if X does not pay, Y will pay X's debt to the bank.
If the borrower defaults on the loan by failing to make payments, the lender can look
to the guarantor for payment of the loan. Id. If the guarantor refuses to pay, the lender
can sue the guarantor and then seize the guarantor's assets, or the lender may be able to
attach assets prior to suit if the assets were pledged as collateral. Robert K. Rasmussen,
Comment, Guaranties and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
194, 194 (1985).
A simple example of a guaranty is where the parents are co-makers on a student loan
for a child. The lender is unwilling to loan to the student because of the high risk of
nonpayment, but is willing to make the loan if the parents are guarantors, since the parents
are likely to make the payments if the student does not, and the lender can reach the
parents' assets upon judgment.
Thus, if the student defaults on the loan, the lender may sue the parents and obtain
satisfaction in the form of a lien. Possible recourse of the creditor may include foreclosing
on the parents' home, gaining possession and selling the parents' cars, or garnishing the
parents' wages.
3. Problems of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign lender are beyond the scope of
this paper. See Allan L. Gropper, Comment, The Bankruptcy Code's Approach to
Multinational Bankruptcies: Basic Legal Framework, 628 PRAC. L. INST. 49, 54-62, 71-72
(1992); Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law
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ty situation is called an upstream guaranty 4  Engen, Inc.
("Engen"), based in the United Kingdom, guarantied a one
hundred million dollar loan from Genbank to Pargen, and Cangen,
Inc. ("Cangen"), based in Canada, similarly guarantied a debt of
one hundred million dollars from Genbank to Pargen.
Pargen immediately defaulted on the loan, and never made
any payments. Once Pargen defaulted, Genbank had the right to
hold the guarantor subsidiary corporations to their guaranties.'
As expected, three months later, Genbank held the subsidiaries to
their guaranties and collected the amounts of the debt owed by
Pargen from the subsidiaries. As will be seen, in the United
States, the trustee can attempt to "avoid" these transfers.
6
One month later, both Engen and Cangen filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 in the United States.7 At that point, the
bankruptcy trustee' filed a motion to avoid the pre-petition
and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991); see also Mary E. Knecht, The
"Drapery of Illusion" of Section 304-What Lurks Beneath: Territoriality in the Judicial
Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. 287 (1992).
4. David S. Walls, Promises to Keep: Intercorporate Guaranties and Fraudulent
Transfers in Bankruptcy, 19 UCC L.J. 219, 228 (1987) (defining an upstream guaranty as
one where the subsidiary guaranties the debt of the parent corporation).
5. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 194. The subsidiary must either pay the obligation
or the assets of the subsidiary will be sold and used to pay off the lender. This situation
can become very complex. In some instances, the parent corporation may require a
subsidiary to guaranty the loans of other subsidiary companies of the parent corporation.
These cross-guaranties can result in serious financial problems. For example, when one
of the subsidiaries goes bankrupt, it may impact all of the parent corporation's holdings.
6. The 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Bill limiting the liability of Non-insider Transferees
does not impact this Comment. The code sections referred to in this Comment were not
amended. H.R. 5116, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1994).
7. Venue and jurisdiction are assumed for the purposes of this Comment. Venue
may be obtained under 11 U.S.C. § 1408(1) where the domicile, residence, principal place
of business, or location of the debtor's principal assets in the United States has existed for
the majority of the past 180 days. 11 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Venue is
also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) where the debtor's affiliate, general partner, or
partnership has a pending bankruptcy. Martin N. Filcs & Michael J. Ireland, Comment,
Bankruptcy and the Problems of Multijurisdictional Workouts, 29 PRAC. L. INST. 415, 416
(1991).
Jurisdiction may be obtained under 11 U.S.C. § 109 or 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), (d). 11
U.S.C. § 109 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), (d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A
foreign subsidiary may file in the United States if it owns assets in the United States or
satisfies other prerequisites contained within the statute. The U.S. court, however, may
not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction over foreign creditors. Therefore, if the transfer
in question was made to a foreign entity, the court might be unable to order the funds or
assets returned. Gropper, supra note 3, at 55-57.
8. The motion may be filed by either the trustee, the debtor-in-possession ("DIP"),
or a creditor. See Scott F. Norberg, Comment, Avoidability of Intercorporate Guarantees
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
transfers as fraudulent.9 If the bankruptcy court holds that the
transfers were fraudulent, Genbank must return the money it
received from Engen and Cangen in connection with the transfers
based on the guaranties. The money returned by Genbank would
then be distributed among Engen's and Cangen's other creditors
in an "equitable" manner.
10
In a "full" Chapter 11 U.S. bankruptcy, the U.S. bankruptcy
court's valuation of the guaranty will impact whether the transfer
may be recovered. This determination could result in a holding
directly contrary to that of a foreign bankruptcy court."
Additionally, foreign creditors may implement foreign involun-
tary bankruptcy proceedings against the foreign debtor in the
foreign country. If this is done, a foreign representative may come
to the U.S. bankruptcy court requesting foreign jurisdiction of the
debtor's assets. This ancillary proceeding is governed by 11 U.S.C.
§ 304. Thus, foreign law may govern whether the transfers are
recoverable, and the results could conflict with U.S. bankruptcy
law."
III. GENERAL BANKRUPTCY POLICIES; CoMITY BALANCING
UNDER ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS
The policies of bankruptcy systems reflect the priorities and
concerns of legislatures. If the bankruptcy system favors creditors,
the courts will attempt to protect the creditors' interests in the
bankrupt's estate rather than reorganizing the debtor.13 Con-
versely, if a bankruptcy system favors debtors it may reflect the
Under Sections 548(a)(2) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1099, 1101
(1986) ("Generally, a creditor or creditor's committee may bring an action to avoid a
transfer or obligation when the trustee or debtor in possession has failed to bring the
action, thereby not fulfilling the statutory duty to collect the assets of the estate."). The
DIP acts as trustee and may move to avoid a fraudulent transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(1988
& Supp. V 1993). Upon application to the court, a creditor may request permission to
pursue avoidance of a fraudulent transfer. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Hereinafter, the term "trustee" is used to refer to any of these parties.
9. By using the avoidance powers under 11 U.S.C. § 548, the transfer is avoided.
10. BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 311 (1993).
11. Jay L. Westbrook, Global Insolvencies in a World of Nation States, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY LAW 27. 30 (Alison Clarke ed., 1991).
12. Id.
13. J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPT-
CY 2-17 to 2-18, 3-403 to 3-404 (1986).
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country's policy that an ongoing entity is more valuable to society
because it provides jobs.
1 4
A. Bankruptcy Policies
Bankruptcy policies impact what laws legislatures implement
and the courts' application of the laws. All countries develop
policies according to their societal norms. The policies countries
develop, however, fall into general categories. One bankruptcy
scholar states:
All bankruptcy law, no matter when or where devised and
enacted, has at least two general objects in view. It aims first
to secure an equitable division of the insolvent debtor's
property among all his creditors, and second it seeks to prevent
conduct on the part of the insolvent debtor detrimental to the
interests of his creditors. In other words, bankruptcy law seeks
to protect the creditors first from one another and, second from
the debtor. A third object, the protection of the honest debtor
from his creditors by means of the discharge, is sought to be
attained in some of the systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no
means the fundamental feature of the law.15
In many Commonwealth countries, speed and economy are
more important than supervision and accountability1 6 There are
also differences in a country's recognition of foreign creditors'
rights and a foreign country's laws. Many countries routinely favor
local creditors over foreign creditors.17 One way a court can
favor local creditors is by refusing to recognize a foreign
jurisdiction's laws." For instance, if a foreign corporation files
for bankruptcy in the United States, U.S. bankruptcy courts
routinely apply U.S. law.19
14. Id.
15. ROBERT L. JORDAN, BANKRUPTCY 20 (3d ed. 1993).
16. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 476.
17. Westbrook, supra note 11, at 28.
18. Some countries have policies that recognize and apply a foreign country's laws
while others do not. For example, a U.S. federal district court held that Australian law
favors its domestic parties by upholding self-dealing and unfair transactions involving third
party insiders. Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R. 373, 379 (D.N.J. 1988).
19. Selinda A. Melnik, Cross-Border Insolvencies: The United States Perspective-A
Primer, in INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES, 628
PRAC. L. INST. 225, 230 (1992) (stating "while the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the issue,
case law assumes that United States substantive law applies in the involuntary or
involuntary case.").
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The United Kingdom attempts to balance both the debtor's
and creditors' interests with the administration of corporate assets.
In the United Kingdom, the policy of facilitating business reorgani-
zation is a recent development in its bankruptcy law.2" U.K.
bankruptcy policy objectives include giving the debtor a fresh start
and providing the maximum return to creditors.2" Additionally,
U.K. law promotes the continuity of businesses by preserving the
value of the corporation.22
The U.K. policy of balancing debtor and creditor interests can
be compared with the two pervasive policies of the U.S. bankrupt-
cy system. The first goal of the U.S. bankruptcy system is to
rehabilitate the debtor.23 Thus, U.S. bankruptcy policy encourag-
es debtors to make a fresh start.24 The second and sometimes
conflicting goal of the U.S. bankruptcy system is to maximize the
value of the estate.25 The primary policy of rehabilitating the
debtor is often reflected in U.S. law. In Chapter 11 bankruptcies,
the Bankruptcy Code encourages and facilitates business reorgani-
zation.6 Thus, unlike U.K. policy, orderly administration is not
one of the primary purposes of U.S. bankruptcy law.
U.S. and U.K. reorganization plans and policies can be
contrasted with Canadian law, which has only recently developed
a modern business reorganization policy.27 With the 1992 legisla-
See Filcs & Ireland, supra note 7, at 416 ("The fact that jurisdictions have different
substantive laws naturally leads debtors and creditors to prefer the jurisdiction most
favorable to the particular party's interests, creating a great deal of controversy when there
is more than one jurisdiction that could administer a bankruptcy.").
20. Alison Clarke, Introduction to CURRENT ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY LAW at v, viii
(Alison Clarke ed., 1991); see also Jeffrey Davis, Bankruptcy, Banking, Free Trade, and
Canada's Refusal to Modernize Its Business Rescue Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 253, 259
(1991).
21. Davis, supra note 20, at 253. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §§ 8-27 (Eng.).
22. Jay L. Westbrook, A Comparison of Bankruptcy Reorganisation in the U.S. with
the Administration Procedure in the U.K., 6 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 86, 87 (1990).
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 174, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6135. See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
24. Lauren D. Rosenthal, Note, Rule lob-5 and Transnational Bankruptcies: Whose
Law Should Apply?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S321, S335 (1993)(stating that Congress has
expressly stated a policy favoring rehabilitation of the debtor); see Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
25. See Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930).
26. BLUM, supra note 10, at 144, 463.
27. E. Bruce Leonard & R. Gordon Marantz, Practical Strategies in Workouts and
Insolvencies in Canada, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES DEALING WITH FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIES 1993: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR LENDERS AND INVESTORS, 671 PRAC. L. INST. 291,296 (1993). Canada's
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tion, however, Canada has begun to act more equitably toward
debtors. Historically, the purpose behind the Canadian Bankrupt-
cy Act was to allow all creditors to proceed equitably." Still, in
Canada, more than in the United Kingdom or the United States,
the bankruptcy system favors creditors.29
Under the Canadian bankruptcy system, debtors have two
options. The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 30 (the "BIA") is
usually used by smaller businesses.3 1 Large corporate debtors,
however, may opt to use the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act (the "Act").32 Under the BIA, transfers may be avoided for
periods up to five years. 33 The Act, however, does not -allow for
any transfers to be avoided.'
Thus, if U.S. courts apply U.S. bankruptcy policies, the results
may contradict the policies behind the bankruptcy laws of other
countries where the provisions of their laws would yield different
results. At issue is whether a foreign debtor should be able to
take advantage of U.S. bankruptcy avoidance procedures.
35
According to some bankruptcy scholars:
A question arises as to whether a foreign entity filing for bank-
ruptcy protection in the U.S. may avoid upstream guarantees
that would have been enforceable under the laws of the relevant
foreign jurisdiction. When a foreign company files for bank-
ruptcy protection in the U.S., it will have access to the avoiding
powers provided in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and would
arguably be empowered to avoid upstream guarantees otherwise
enforceable under the law of the foreign jurisdiction. However,
a U.S. bankruptcy court arguably should abstain from proceed-
new insolvency legislation became effective November 30, 1992.
28. In In re Wilanour Resources, Ltd., the court noted that the purpose behind the
Canadian Bankruptcy Act is "the orderly distribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor
ratably among his creditors." In re Wilanour Resources, Inc., 43 C.B.R. 153, 155 (1982)
(Can.).
29. Id. at 319.
30. R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 1 (1985), amended by ch. 27, 1992 S.C. (Can.)
31. Leonard & Marantz, supra note 27, at 304.
32. R.S.C., ch. C-25, § 1 (1985) (Can.). According to Jeffrey Davis, the Act is limited
to debtors with "outstanding bonds or debentures issued under a trust deed." Davis, supra
note 20, at 259 n.38.
33. Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 91(2) (1985) (Can.).
34. Leonard & Marantz, supra note 27, at 304.
35. Joseph Samet et al., Multinational Insolvencies, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES DEALING WITH FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND
INSOLVENCIES 1993: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR LENDERS AND INVESTORS, 671 PRAC.
L. INST. 7, 28 (1993).
1995]
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ings filed primarily to achieve such result, especially where the
foreign guarantor's U.S. assets are insignificant in relation to its
foreign assets.
36
Another consideration that is not taken into account is
Engen's and Cangen's relationship with the United States. It is
not reasonable to allow Engen and Cangen to take advantage of
U.S. bankruptcy laws if the only property Engen or Cangen hold
in the United States is a small bank account. On the other hand,
if there is substantial contact by Engen and Cangen to the United
States, it seems more reasonable to use U.S. bankruptcy laws. By
analogy, U.S. bankruptcy courts could utilize a "minimum
contacts" test similar to that developed in federal jurisdiction
cases. 7 Because U.S. bankruptcy courts are federal courts, the
analogy seems reasonable. Therefore, in determining which
country's laws to apply under the minimum contacts test, the court
could look to a developed body of law. Utilizing the minimum
contacts test would alleviate the need for U.S. bankruptcy courts
to apply their usual ad hoc methods.
B. US. Bankruptcy Ancillary Proceedings and the Principle of
Comity
Under 11 U.S.C. § 304, a foreign representative may request
the U.S. bankruptcy court to recognize a foreign country's
jurisdiction or law.38 A section 304 proceeding would be likely if,
for instance, a foreign creditor implemented an involuntary
bankruptcy of the debtor in the foreign country. The U.S.
bankruptcy court may either recognize the foreign country's
jurisdiction or law, or dismiss the proceeding.39 Unless the
36. Id.
37. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
38. Rosenthal, supra note 24, at S336 (stating that Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 304
to encourage U.S. courts to defer to foreign law).
Canadian law also allows for recognition of foreign claims based on the principle of
comity. Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd., 70 C.B.R. 97, 62 Alta. L.R.2d 193, 92 A.R. 51, (1989)
1 W.W.R. 251, 54 D.L.R. 4th 117 (Q.B.) (1988) (Can.); Pitts v. Hill & Hill TruckLine, Inc.,
53 Alta L.R.2d 219, 66 C.B.R. 273, (application dismissed) sub nom Pitts v. Hill 84 A.R.
333 (1987) (Can.). The Canadian Bankruptcy Act also accords the trustee "statutory
power to act anywhere in the world to obtain possession of the bankrupt's property and
to realize on it: subsection 12(6)." JOHN R. VARLEY, THE EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS ON CREDITOR REMEDIES 4 (1988).
39. Melnik, supra note 19, at 230.
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foreign countries bankruptcy laws are similar to the United States
bankruptcy laws, however, courts are unlikely to utilize foreign
laws.'
The policies of 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) encourage bankruptcy
courts to engage in an ad hoc balancing of competing interests to
determine which law to apply.41 The courts are "guided by what
will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of
such estate . ,,42 Six factors used in the ad hoc balancing are:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in
such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such
foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispossession of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start for the individual who such foreign proceeding concerns.43
If foreign law is recognized, the U.S. bankruptcy court may
have difficulty administering the estate due to the different policy
concerns of different countries, the dispositions of the estate, and
the way in which the issues of insolvency and fraudulent transfers
are determined."
J. H. Dalhuisen, a bankruptcy scholar, promotes the use of the
foreign country's laws, stating:
If one assumes that foreign and local creditors are always
treated equally and may recover everywhere ... the foreign
creditors should have resort to local.., actions against whatev-
er transaction or asset might be reached thereunder in any
particular jurisdiction and the foreign action may not need
40. Knecht, supra note 3, at 288.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Westbrook, supra note 11, at 37 ("the
listing of 'comity' as one of the factors to be considered, although doubtless intended to
reinforce the policy of deference, can have the perverse effect of making comity seem just
one more factor to be weighed.").
42. L
43. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c).
44. DALHUISEN, supra note 13, at 3-409 to 3-411.
19951 417
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contemplation, at least not outside bankruptcy proceedings
45
According to Dalhuisen, "accommodating the true bankruptcy
conflicts ... will largely depend to what extent the adjudicating
court, short of statutory or treaty law to the effect, may conceiv-
ably make concessions in order to take care of the foreign interests
involved.'46
If a foreign country's bankruptcy or accounting standards are
used, there may be dissimilar results in a fraudulent transfer action
because of the resulting solvency or insolvency of a debtor. U.S.
bankruptcy courts may have difficulty interpreting a foreign
country's statutes and cases; similar language does not mean
similar interpretations or policies.47 Although concerned about
comity, U.S. bankruptcy courts are wary about determining the
meaning of individual states' laws, much less the laws of other
countries.' U.S. courts are in conflict when it comes to whether
they should recognize foreign laws While some bankruptcy courts
have followed foreign law,49 others have allowed foreign debtors
to take advantage of U.S. law.50
IV. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, INSOLVENCY, GUARANTY
VALUATION, AND OUTCOMES
In determining whether a transaction was constructively
fraudulent,5 and therefore avoidable, the bankruptcy court will
45. Id. at 3-340. Dalhuisen further notes that "the effects on the ordinary course of
business and interested parties in the place of enforcement need to be considered and
balanced, and this applies all the more so to extraterritorial effects of bankruptcy at large."
Id
46. Id at 3-409.
47. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 481-82.
48. DALHUISEN, supra note 13, at 3-268.
49. In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891, 896, 904 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Metzeler, 78 B.R.
674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
50. In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni di Navigazioni, 26 B.R. 494, 497 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983); In re Comstat Consulting Serv., Ltd., 10 B.R. 134, 135 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
51. According to Norberg:
Section 548(a)(2) permits the trustee to avoid transfers and obligations that are
deemed constructively fraudulent. A transfer or obligation is constructively
fraudulent if it was made or incurred (1) "on or within one year before the date
of the filing of the petition," (2) in exchange for "less than a reasonably
equivalent value," (3) at a time when the debtor was in poor financial condition.
Under Section 548(a)(2), the trustee need not prove actual intent to defraud
creditors.
Norberg, supra note 8, at 1102.
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determine whether Engen and Cangen became insolvent when
they incurred or satisfied the guaranty obligation.52 In determin-
ing whether Engen and Cangen were insolvent, it is unlikely that
U.S. bankruptcy courts would use the foreign country's accounting
practices as opposed to U.S. bankruptcy law. U.S. bankruptcy and
circuit courts decline to use U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (G.A.A.P), much less the accounting principles of
another country. 3
In order for the trustee to prove Engen and Cangen insolvent,
the trustee must determine the amount of debt on their respective
balance sheets. The resulting balance sheet is not the actual
corporate balance sheet used for the corporation's accounting
purposes, rather it is for the Court's use in determining whether
the transfer was avoidable. The guaranty from Engen and Cangen
to Genbank will be listed as a debt on each of their balance sheets.
A main concern is whether the entire guaranty, part of the
guaranty or none of the guaranty should be listed as a debt on the
balance sheet. If the full guaranty is listed, then it is more likely
that Engen or Cangen became insolvent due to the transaction,
thus allowing the trustee to void the transaction. If only part or
52. Other countries determine if a transaction was a fraudulent transfer by dissimilar
methods:
a. In France, the presumptive period for insolvency is eighteen months prior to the
debtor's bankruptcy filing. Those categories for which the transfer will be void per se
include transfers for less than full value and payments of matured debt in a manner other
than an established means of payment. Other acts that are voidable include payments for
valuable consideration where the lender knew of the debtor's cessation of payments.
b. In Belgium and Luxembourg, the presumptive period for insolvency is six months
prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing. These countries closely follow the French system
and also use the specified categories for void and voidable transactions.
c. In West Germany, the period in which transfers may be deemed fraudulent is six
months prior to the.debtor bankruptcy filing. There is no presumption that any transfers
are void per se. Transactions may not be voided unless the transaction caused damage to
the creditors as a whole.
d. In the Netherlands, the presumptive period is only forty days prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy filing. There are only three transactions that may qualify for this presumption:
transactions for inadequate consideration, transactions where the debtor grants the lender
a security interest for a pre-existing debt, and transactions with family members.
e. In Italy, there is a complex system of "suspect" periods. The Italian system
focuses on the beneficiary's knowledge that the debtor was insolvent. If the trustee can
prove the beneficiary's knowledge, the trustee can look back for a period of one year prior
to the debtor's bankruptcy filing for some transactions, and two years for others.
DALHUISEN, supra note 13, at 3-329 to 3-340.
53. See infra discussion Part IV.A.2. and Part IV.A.3.
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none of the guaranty is listed, it is more likely Engen or Cangen
will be deemed solvent, thus making the transfer valid.
The way in which the guaranty is listed on Engen's and
Cangen's balance sheets may determine whether Engen and
Cangen were solvent at the time of the transfer.' Bankruptcy
courts could value guaranties in three ways. First, because
Genbank realized the full value of the guaranties from Engen and
Cangen, it seems appropriate to list the entire guaranty on Engen's
and Cangen's respective balance sheets as a liability. With the full
value of the guaranty listed on their balance sheets, it is more
likely that Engen and Cangen would appear insolvent at the time
the transfer was made.5 If Engen or Cangen is deemed to have
been insolvent at the time the transfer occurred, the transaction
would be considered fraudulent, and Genbank would be required
to return the funds obtained from Engen and Cangen to the bank-
ruptcy estate.56 Allowing the full amount of the guaranty on the
balance sheet may appear to be a better approach because, in
hindsight, the full amount was actually paid. Additionally, this
calculation has the benefit of certainty and easy application.
A second approach courts could take is to determine that, at
the time Engen and Cangen gave Genbank their guaranties, it was
not certain that they would be required to pay any liability due to
the guaranty. In making this valuation determination, the court
could allow Cangen to list less than the full amount of the
guaranty on their balance sheet. By listing a partial amount on
their balance sheets, Engen and Cangen would be more likely to
appear solvent at the time of the transfer than if the full amount
is listed. Therefore, Genbank would not be required to return the
assets received under the guaranties if the court finds Engen and
Cangen solvent.
Under the third approach, the court could consider valuing the
guaranties to be too speculative, and, therefore, place the value of
54. To determine insolvency, the court will consider whether the debtor was in poor
financial condition before, or as a result of, the transaction. Financial condition may be
determined by analyzing whether the debtor was insolvent (e.g., where liabilities exceed
assets), whether the debtor was undercapitalized, and whether the debtor's subjective
belief about its ability to pay its debts as they matured. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
55. The full amount of the guaranty would be, of course, greater than a partial amount
or no amount of the guaranty.
56. BLUM, supra note 10, at 309.
57. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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the guaranty at zero. An alternative reason for valuing the
guaranty at zero is a subsequent full value payment of the loan by
Pargen to Genbank. Thus, Engen's and Cangen's debt would be
effectively nullified. Engen and Cangen have the greatest chance
of appearing solvent under this approach. This calculation has the
benefit of definiteness and easy application.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada each
view fraudulent transfers, insolvency, and guaranty valuation
differently. Each country's view reflects the policies on which its
bankruptcy system is based.
A. The U.S. View of Fraudulent Transfers, Insolvency, and
Guaranty Valuation
1. U.S. Fraudulent Transfers
Under U.S. bankruptcy law, the transfer of assets from the
subsidiaries, Engen and Cangen, to Genbank may be considered
fraudulent if Engen or Cangen became insolvent by incurring the
obligation or by honoring their guaranties. 8 If one or both of the
transfers are considered fraudulent, the trustee could avoid the
transfers and force Genbank to turn over the money or assets it
received from Engen and Cangen to the bankruptcy court for the
benefit of Engen's and Cangen's creditors. 9
Section 548(a), which governs fraudulent transfers in the
United States, provides as follows: "The trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation
incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition ...."60
Pursuant to section 548, a trustee may show that a transfer
was fraudulent in two ways. Under the first method, the trustee
would have to prove the debtor had actual fraudulent intent.61
58. In the United States, one of the elements of a fraudulent transfer is that the debtor
must be insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. BLUM, supra note 10, at 309, 350.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
61. According to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), the transfer can be avoided if the transfer was
made within one year preceding the debtor's filing of bankruptcy with the "intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud." it § 548(a)(1).
For the purposes of § 548(a)(1), the "solvency" of the debtor does not matter.
Therefore, it does not matter whether the debtor is considered insolvent at the time of the
transfer if the transfer was made with the intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud." Id.
1995]
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Under the second method, the transfer can be avoided for
several reasons, one reason being that the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer.12  The lender may have a defense,
however, such as the "reasonably equivalent value" defense or the
"good faith/financial condition of the debtor" defense for the
guaranty.' The transaction cannot reduce the debtor's net worth
measured at the time the obligation was incurred,' and benefits
received by the debtor/guarantor can be indirect.65 Starting with
In re Rubin,' the bankruptcy courts have accepted the "reason-
ably equivalent value" defense for upstream guaranties.67 For
purposes of this Comment, the second method is relevant to prove
that the transfer was fraudulent, because this Comment does not
address the intricacies of proving "intent."
Thus, under U.S. bankruptcy law, one of the determinative
factors in ascertaining whether the transfer from Engen or Cangen
was fraudulent is whether Engen or Cangen was insolvent at the
62. I § 548(a)(2). Section 548(a)(2) provides:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property,
or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily...
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer
or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
Id (emphasis added).
63. Norberg, supra note 8, at 1102. According to Norberg:
A transfer or obligation is constructively fraudulent if it was made or incurred (1)
"on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition," (2) in
exchange for "less than a reasonably equivalent value," (3) at a time when the
debtor was in poor financial condition. Under section 548(a)(2), the trustee need
not prove actual intent to defraud creditors.
Id
64. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 211. A recent preference case, however, stated that
the court may look to what actually happened to determine value. In re LCO Enterprises,
12 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1993).
65. Some scholars argue that there should be a rebuttable presumption against the
existence of a reasonably equivalent value. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 216.
66. In re Rubin Bros. Foot Wear, Inc., 73 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
67. See In re Royal Crown Bottlers, 23 B.R. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982).
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time the obligation was made or became insolvent due to the
obligation or transfer.
2. U.S. Insolvency
U.S. and foreign bankruptcy courts define and determine
insolvency differently.' In the United States, 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(32)(A) defines corporate insolvency as a condition where the
corporation's debt is greater than all of the entity's property
(assets) at fair market value.69 Fraudulent transfers and exempt
properties are not included on the balance sheet as either debts or
assets when calculating whether a corporation is insolvent.70
Therefore, whether Engen or Cangen will be considered insolvent
depends on whether Engen's or Cangen's liabilities exceed their
assets.7 This test for insolvency is commonly called the "balance
68. According to Dalhuisen, methods of determining insolvency in other countries
include:
[1] In France, cessation of payments is required ....
2] In Belgium and Luxembourg equally the requirement is cessation of payments
... [and] the additional requirement is that no more credit is available ....
[3] In Italy, insolvency (cessation of payments) is defined as the inability of the
debtor to regularly fulfill his obligations ... to be deduced from the behavior of
the debtor or the circumstances ....
[4] In West Germany the opening ground is normally cessation of payments ...
a situation in which, because of continued lack of funds, the debtor finds himself
unable to effectively meet his maturing obligations ... economic insolvency also
suffices.
[5] In the Netherlands, finally, cessation of payments requires notably a plurality
of creditors awaiting payments so that a concursus creditorum results ...
economic insolvency being notably not required but it is a sufficient ground for
bankruptcy of decedent's estates ....
DALHUISEN, supra note 13, at 3-319 to 3-320.
Insolvency is not always required to file for bankruptcy in the United States, as
illustrated by the case of a voluntary petition.
For involuntary straight bankruptcy petitions, insolvency is required, which is also
the case for Chapter 11 involuntary petitions. For purposes of opening the
proceedings, insolvency is now defined in [section] 303(h) as the debtor generally
not paying his debts as they mature (and not through the balance sheet test of
11 [U.S.C.] § 101(26) which is used for other purposes, notable for the avoidance
provisions). The sole other ground is the surrender of virtually all of the
property of the debtor to a custodian within 120 days before the date of filing.
No such insolvency test or appointment of a custodian is necessary for voluntary
petitions. ([§§] 301, 303(h)).
Id. at 3-319.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
70. Id. § 101(32)(A)(i).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) states:
"[I]nsolvent" means-
(A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality,
financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater that all
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 17:409
sheet test" and differs from the test of insolvency in equity.'
Whether Engen's or Cangen's liabilities exceed their assets, may
depend on how the bankruptcy court values the guaranties that
Engen and Cangen made to Genbank.
3. Guaranty Valuation in the United States
The "balance sheet test" treats a guaranty as contingent
liabilities on the debtor's balance sheet.73 The amount of the
guaranty included on the balance sheet can have an impact on
whether or not a corporation will be deemed insolvent. If a
corporation is insolvent, the trustee could possibly avoid the
transfer of assets as a fraudulent transfer.
In the United States, several circuit courts allow guaranties to
be listed on balance sheets as contingent liabilities.74 As a contin-
gent liability, the full value of the guaranty is not listed on the
balance sheet.75 Alternatively, other circuit courts have ruled that
the contingent liability, or asset, should be discounted by the
probability the contingency will occur.76
In In re Xonics, Photochemical Inc., the Seventh Circuit stated
in dicta that contingent liabilities, which include guaranties, should
not be valued on the balance sheet at face value.77 In its exam-
of such entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of -
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under
section 522 of this title ....
72. In equity, a corporation is deemed insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts as they
come due. Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303 (1944); In re Frigitemp Corp., 34 B.R. 1000
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 753 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Keydata Corp., 37 B.R. 324
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
73. Norberg, supra note 8, at 1117.
74. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Sierra
Steel, Inc., 96 B.R. 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657(7th Cir. 1992).
76. Xonics, 841 F.2d at 200. Judge Posner further stated in dicta: "the asset or liability
must be reduced to its present, or expected, value before a determination can be made
whether the firm's assets exceed its liabilities." Id. For the theory that the full value of
a contingent liability should be listed on the balance sheet, see Norberg, supra note 8, at
1112-21. The court in Xonics specifically addressed this question and found that argument
unpersuasive. Xonics, 841 F.2d at 200.
77. Xonics, 841 F.2d at 200. The court stated:
There is a compelling reason not to value contingent liabilities on the balance
sheet at their face amounts, even if that would be possible to do because the
liability, despite being contingent, is for a specified amount (that is, even if there
is no uncertainty about what the firm will owe if the contingency materializes).
By definition, a contingent liability is not certain-and often is highly unlike-
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pie, however, the court multiplied the percentage of the likelihood
that the contingent liability would become a certainty by the value
of the assets on the balance sheet, instead of the value of the
contingent liability itself. 8 The result of such an approach would
be that no corporation would ever be insolvent.79
In Xonics, the issue was whether Xonics Photochemical, the
debtor/guarantor, was insolvent at the time that it made payments
to Mitsui & Co., a supplier of chemicals.80 Xonics Photochemical
had executed guaranties for the debt of Xonics, Inc., the parent
corporation, and other subsidiaries of Xonics, Inc., including
Xonics Medical Systems.81 The dispositive issue for this study
was how the contingent liability of the guaranty should be listed on
the debtor's balance sheet; the method of listing the guaranty
determined whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer." The Xonics court stated that the contingent liability
would be discounted by the probability that the contingency would
occur.83 The example the court used to illustrate the concept
was:
Suppose that on the date the obligations were assumed there
was a 1% chance that Xonics Photochemical would ever be
called on to yield up its assets to creditors of Xonics Medical
Systems (or other members of the Xonics family, since the
system of guaranties had the effect of pooling its assets for the
benefit of creditors of any member). Then the true measure of
ly-ever to become an actual liability. To value the contingent liability it is





80. Id. at 199.
81. Id. at 199.
82. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988).
83. For a proposal of a more accurate valuation method, see Rasmussen, supra note
2, at 212. Rasmussen uses expected value calculations of all the probabilities and
contingencies. Thus, instead of stating there was a 10% chance that the debtor would be
required to pay a $1,000,000.00 guaranty, which would result in the guaranty being listed
on the balance sheet as $100,000.00, Rasmussen would calculate the guaranty as follows:
10% chance of the debtor being required to fully pay the guaranty, 15% chance that the
debtor would be required to repay 75% of the loan, 20% chance that the debtor would
be required to repay 50% of the loan, 20% chance that the debtor would be required to
pay 25% of the loan, and 35% chance that the debtor would not need to pay any of the
loan. Thus, in calculating: $100,000.00 + $112,500.00 + $100,000.00 + $50,000.00 + $0.00
= 362,500.00. For a more detailed calculation, see Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 212.
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the liability created by these obligations on the date it was
assumed would not be $28 million; it would be a paltry $17,000.
For at worst Xonics Photochemical would have to yield up all
of its assets (net of other liabilities), that is, $1.7 million, and the
probability of this outcome is by assumption only 1 percent (we
are ignoring intermediate possibilities-e.g. that Xonics
Photochemical would be forced to cough up $1 million rather
than $1.7 million). Discounted, the obligations would not make
Xonics insolvent .... 84
The court further stated that whether the corporation was
solvent at the time of the transfer was not at issue because all
parties agreed that if the guaranty was a valid obligation, then the
debtor was insolvent.85 Thus, because the guaranty was a valid
obligation, insolvency was presumed. The court erred in using the
corporate assets to determine solvency or insolvency.8 6 By using
the assets net liabilities, the court would never find any corpora-
tion insolvent, unless it was insolvent without the guaranty at the
time the guaranty was given.87
The Seventh Circuit corrected the error of the Xonics court
and applied the issue of insolvency in Covey v. Commercial Nat'l
Bank of Peoria.88 In Covey, the trustee brought an adversary
proceeding to avoid the lender's collection on a guaranty.8 9
Commercial National Bank of Peoria ("Bank") had made a loan
to Jobst Corporation ("Parent") and only obtained guaranties from
Parent's subsidiary corporations, including V. Jobst & Sons.9°
When Parent went bankrupt, V. Jobst & Sons' assets were sold,
and Bank collected the receivables under the guaranty.91 The
84. Xonics, 841 F.2d at 200.
85. Id. at 199.
86. Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 675, 660 (7th Cir. 1992).
87. Id. As noted by the court in Covey:
If we use net assets as the maximum value of a contingent liability, it follows that
no contingent liability ever renders any firm insolvent. A $5 million note issued
by a firm with $4 million in assets propels the firm into insolvency, but a $5
billion guarantee by the same firm, on which the beneficiary is a 99% certain
draw, would not: instead of multiplying $5 billion by 0.99, the court would
multiply $4 million by 0.99. Yet all would concede that, from the debtor's
perspective, the guarantee is more costly than the unconditional note.
Id.
88. It at 657.
89. Id. at 658-59.
90. Jobst had been created as a holding company, and its only asset was the stock of
its subsidiaries. Id. at 658.
91. Covey, 960 F.2d at 658.
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trustee tried to recover those assets from Bank. The trustee
argued that there was a fraudulent transfer because the transfer
from the subsidiary to Bank was made while the subsidiary was
insolvent.92 The issue was how the value of the contingent
liability/guaranty would be listed on the balance sheet.93 The
value of the guaranty would thus determine whether V. Jobst &
Sons was insolvent when the transfer of assets to Bank oc-
curred.94
The district court held there was a sixty percent chance that
the parent corporation would default, allowing the bank to collect
on the guaranty from the subsidiary. The appellate court held
that the percentage should be multiplied by the total amount of
the contingent liability. % When applied to the balance sheet, the
calculation left the debtor insolvent, and therefore the transfer was
avoided.' This application allowed the court to conclude that the
corporation was insolvent at the time of the guaranty.98 As the
court stated, "[t]he Bankruptcy Code requires us to assess things
from the debtor's perspective. "99
Covey is also important because it acknowledged Xonics'
departure from standard accounting practices, but stated that the
departure was not pertinent. i°  The court held that the perti-
92. Id. at 659.
93. Id. at 658.
94. Id at 660.
95. Id at 659.
96. Covey, 960 F.2d at 660.
97. The bank tried to argue that the percentage should be multiplied by the value of
V. Jobst & Sons's assets. The court disagreed, however, noting that Xonics' figures were
only illustrative, not decisive. The court further stated: "If we use net assets as the
maximum value of a contingent liability, it follows that no contingent liability ever renders
any firm insolvent." Id at 660.
98. Id The court's analysis included the following example:
The Bankruptcy Code requires us to assess things from the debtor's perspective.
Consider a simple case. Debtor issues its note for $10 million. It has assets of
$5 million, secured debt of $2 million, and no other debt. From the creditor's
perspective this note is worth somewhat less than $3 million. (Collection is costly
and uncertain.) Together, Debtor's creditors place a value of less than $5 million
on its commitments. Nonetheless, Debtor is insolvent. Against assets of $5
million there are claims of $12 million. Now turn the $10 million note into a
guarantee of a parent corporation's $50 million debt, coupled with a probability
of 20% that the Debtor will be called on to pay. The two commitments are
economically equivalent: $10,000,000 = $50,000,000 x .02.
Id
99. Id
100. Covey, 960 F.2d at 660; see also In re Sierra Steel, Inc., 96 B.R. 275, 278-79 (9th
Cir. 1989). In Sierra, the Ninth Circuit determined whether a debtor was insolvent at the
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 17:409
nent question was: "[w]hat would a buyer be willing to pay for the
debtor's entire package of assets and liabilities? If the price is
positive, the firm is solvent; if negative, insolvent."'01
Thus, in the United States, G.A.A.P. are not controlling and
bankruptcy judges are the arbiters of how insolvency is deter-
mined. Currently, most bankruptcy courts follow the Xonics-
Covey standard for determining solvency: the likelihood that the
guarantor corporation will be called upon to back up its guaranty
multiplied by the total contingent liability to determine solven-
cy.
102
U.S. bankruptcy courts approach guaranties subjectively. The
bankruptcy court, supposedly without hindsight, determines the
likelihood of the parent corporation defaulting on the guaranty.
The calculation is an imprecise figure when calculated by a
financial statistician, much less by the judiciary.
time of transfer. Sierra, 96 B.R. at 278-79. The DIP, Sierra Steel, Inc., filed an adversary
proceeding seeking to recover a transfer made to Totten Tubes, Inc., due to Sierra's
"insolvency" at the time of the transfer. The transfer occurred eighty-seven days prior to
Sierra's filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11. Although the court upheld the
"balance sheet test," it also held that, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(G.A.A.P.) were not controlling:
The authorities cited by the debtor do not compel the conclusion that the
bankruptcy court must follow G.A.A.P. in making solvency determinations.
Requiring application of G.A.A.P. would make accountants and the board which
promulgate G.A.A.P. the arbiters of insolvency questions. Clearly the Code
provides that judges should make such decisions... . Thus although G.A.A.P. are
relevant, they are not controlling in insolvency determinations.
Sierra, 96 B.R. at 278.
In Sierra, the court deleted the contingent liability of a claim in litigation because it
considered the debt, a tax liability, as having no probability of becoming real because the
debtor was operating at a loss. The debt was not included in determining solvency. Sierra,
96 B.R. at 228-89.
101. Covey, 960 F.2d at 660; see also In re Parker Steel Company, 149 B.R. 834, 845
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (stating "[i]n valuing Debtor's liability ... although G.A.A.P. are
relevant, they are not controlling.").
102. See In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), In re
Davis, 148 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
But see In re Parker Steel Company, 149 B.R. 834, 838-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(allowing only $1,208,255 in contingent liabilities rather than the $1,500,000 listed on the
debtor's balance sheet. This contingent liability arose from a pre-petition lawsuit seeking
damages for breach of contract due to Parker's failure to deliver a shipment of steel.
Thus, in Parker, by utilizing a figure to which the parties stipulated was the fair or present
value, the court avoided the Xonics error).
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4. The Consequences of U.S. Bankruptcy Law
If U.S. bankruptcy courts use U.S. bankruptcy laws, the
domestic creditors of both Engen and Cangen will be treated
equally, because the same principles and laws apply to both
bankruptcies. 3 If the bankruptcy court determined that the
likelihood of Pargen defaulting on its loan to Genbank was twenty
percent, the following balance sheets result (in millions):
ENGEN CANGEN
ASSETS LIABILITIES ASSETS LIABILITIES





Thus, at the time of the guaranty, both Engen and Cangen
would be considered solvent, and the transfer would not be
considered fraudulent. Note, however, that if the percentage is
increased by as little as six percent, a contrary outcome will result.
B. The UK. View of Fraudulent Transfers, Insolvency, and
Guaranty Valuation
1. U.K. Fraudulent Transfers
By applying U.S. law, the U.S. bankruptcy court may frustrate
foreign bankruptcy policies. The different outcome that results
103. Foreign creditors, however, may find themselves subject to 11 U.S.C. § 508(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). According to some bankruptcy scholars:
Section 508(a), which appears to have been the subject of no reported cases to
date, provides that creditors receiving distributions in foreign proceedings may
not receive distributions in U.S. proceedings on such claims until other creditors
with claims in the U.S. proceedings have received equal amounts.
Samet et al., supra note 35, at 25.
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from applying foreign law can be illustrated by applying U.K.
bankruptcy law to Engen's bankruptcy. U.K. bankruptcy law is
governed by chapter 45 of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Under
U.K. law, fraudulent transactions are combined with preferences
as transactions at an undervalue. Section 238 of chapter 45 of the
Insolvency Act of 1986 provides:
(4) For the purposes of this section ... a company enters into
a transaction with a person at an undervalue if ... (b) the
company enters into a transaction with that person for consider-
ation the value of which, in money or money's worth, signifi-
cantly less than the value, in money or money's worth, of the
consideration provided by the company"' 4
The Insolvency Act of 1986 discusses preferences in section
239:
(4) For the purposes of this section ... a company gives a
preference to a person if-(a) that person is one of the
company's creditors or a surety or guarantor for any of the
company's debts or other liabilities, and (b) the company does
anything or suffers anything to be done which (in either case)
has the effect of putting that person into a position which, in the
event of the company going into insolvent liquidation, will be
better than the position he would have been in if that thing had
not been done."'
A "trustee" in the United Kingdom can recover property the
debtor had transferred up to six months prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy filing or up to two years if the transfer was given to "a
person who is connected with the company."' 6  Additionally,
both section 238 and 239 are conditioned by section 240, which
limits whether a transaction will be "at an undervalue" to those
where the debtor is insolvent."° Generally, the burden of proof
is on the trustee to show that the debtor was insolvent. 1"8 This
presumption is reversed, however, if the transfer is made to a
person connected with the company.1°9
104. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 238(4)(b) (Eng.).
105. Id § 239(4)(a), (b).
106. Id. § 240(1)(a), (b).
107. Id § 240(2)(a), (b).
108. Id § 240(2)(b).




In the United Kingdom, a debtor is considered insolvent if it
is unable to pay its debts as they become due.11 This "test" for
insolvency can be applied in one of three ways: (1) if a debtor is
unable to pay its debts as they become due, (2) if a debtor's
liabilities exceed its assets, or (3) if a debtor does not pay an
obligation within a specified period."' As previously noted, for
preferences and fraudulent transfers, the transfer must have
occurred at a time the company was insolvent or the transaction
must have made the company insolvent. 12 Like the process in
the United States, whether Engen is insolvent may turn on how
the guaranty is valued on Engen's balance sheet. Unlike the
United States, however, insolvency is not limited to the balance
sheet test.
3. Guaranty Valuation in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom espouses the view of some U.S.
bankruptcy courts that it is either difficult or speculative to value
guaranties. In one U.K. tax case considering the valuation of
guaranties, the taxpayer's counsel and Special Commissioner
argued that it was "quite impossible to place a rational value on
guarantees. In effect the rather speculative submissions of the
Crown's representative on this topic bear this out. How do you
value the guarantees in monetary terms? I do not think you
can. ' 113 The court agreed, stating: "there was no basis on which
a separate and additional monetary value could be placed on the
guarantee as part of the consideration to be added to the undoubt-
ed monetary price paid which was the true open market price.
... "' According to U.K. courts, the guaranties could not be
valued because there was no market. 115
110. Id. § 268.
111. DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 138-39
(1992).
112. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 240(2)(a), (b) (Eng.).
113. Fielder v. Vedlynn, Ltd., 1992 S.T.C. 553 (Eng.). Although this was a tax case,
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In the United Kingdom, subject to the debtor's right to
appeal, the trustee can estimate the value of guaranties. 16
Nonetheless, if the lender claims the full amount of the debt from
the guarantor, and the principal debtor makes payments, the
lender may not receive more than the full amount of the debt."7
Thus, if U.K. law is used for Engen's bankruptcy, Genbank may
claim the full amount of the guaranty in Engen's bankruptcy. If
Pargen subsequently pays part or all of its debt to Genbank,
however, Genbank cannot additionally obtain the full amount of
the claim from the distribution of Engen's bankruptcy estate.
4. The Consequences of U.K. Bankruptcy Law
Under U.K. bankruptcy law, Engen's guaranty could be
valued in one of two ways: (1) the guaranty could be valued at
zero, or (2) the court could estimate the value. If the U.S.
bankruptcy court estimates the value of the guaranty pursuant to
an ancillary proceeding, it seems likely that its calculation would
be similar to the one used in U.S. bankruptcies. Therefore, the
estimate of twenty percent is used here.
The resulting balance sheets would appear as follows (in
millions):
ENGEN (U.K. ZERO ENGEN (U.K. PERCENT
VALUE) VALUE)
ASSETS LIABILITIES ASSETS LIABILITIES





Thus, under U.K. bankruptcy law, Engen could be considered
solvent under the "balance sheet test." Engen could be considered




insolvent, however, under one of the other tests for insolvency
regardless of their solvency under the balance sheet test. If Engen
had not been paying its debts as they became due, U.K. bankrupt-
cy courts would consider Engen insolvent and force Genbank to
return the assets received from Engen. Therefore, U.K. bankrupt-
cy law may allow recovery while U.S. bankruptcy law would not
allow recovery.
C. The Canadian View of Fraudulent Transfers, Insolvency, and
Guaranty Valuation
1. Canadian Fraudulent Transfers
By applying U.S. bankruptcy law, U.S. courts may frustrate
Canadian bankruptcy policies. Applying Canadian bankruptcy law
to Cangen's bankruptcy illustrates the different outcome(s).
Under Canadian law, debtors can file under the Act or the
BIA.1 8 Under the Act, there is no provision to recover pay-
ments." 9 A creditor cannot be forced to return payments re-
ceived from the debtor, regardless of the debtor's insolvency.12 °
Under the BIA, there are four alternatives available that allow
recovery of payments made by the debtor. First, "[a]ny settlement
of property, if the settlor becomes bankrupt within five years after
the date of the settlement, is void against the trustee if the trustee
can prove that the settlor was, at the time of making the settle-
ment, unable to pay all his debts ... ."121 Second, under the
BIA a guaranty may be attacked as a preference if the transfer
was made within three months prior to the insolvent debtor's
bankruptcy filing.122 Third, under the Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, "[i]f the debtor's intent is fraudulently to prefer one or more
of his creditors or (arguably) to defeat, hinder, delay, or prejudice
the non-preferred creditors, the preference is commonly described
118. Leonard & Marantz, supra note 27, at 304.
119. Id at 317.
120. Id.
121. Bankruptcy Act., R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 91(2) (1985) (Can.). See Derrick C.A. Tay, The
Canadian Law of Guarantees: An Overview and Examination of Particular Canadian Issues
for American Lawyers, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC GUARANTIES AND OTHER COLLATERAL ASSURANCES
OF PERFORMANCE, 501 PRAC. L. INST. 135, 161-66 (1989).
122. Tay, supra note 121, at 162-63.
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as 'unjust' or 'fraudulent."" 23  The trustee must prove that the
debtor had the intent to prefer one creditor or guaranty over
another. 2 4  The fourth method is under the Assignments and
Preferences Act, which requires the joint intent "to both give and
receive the fraudulent preference."' 25
2. Canadian Insolvency
The Canadian determinations of insolvency are similar to
those of the United Kingdom. In Canada, a debtor can be found
insolvent in three ways: (1) when a debtor is unable to meet its
obligation as it becomes due; (2) when, in the ordinary course of
business, the debtor is unable to meet its financial obligation as it
becomes due; or (3) when, if all of the debtor's assets were
liquidated, the debtor would not be able to cover its debts.
126
Thus, under Canadian law, Cangen could be considered insolvent,
whether or not its liabilities exceeded its assets.
3. Guaranty Valuation in Canada
In Canada, it is not clear whether future obligations must be
calculated. 127 The trustee must "put all such claims to the Bank-
ruptcy Court for valuation., 128 This law has resulted in disparate
holdings. In some instances, Canadian bankruptcy courts have
held that only liquidated liabilities should be used to determine
whether a debtor is bankrupt.1 29  In other cases, however, the
bankruptcy courts have held that the guaranty is considered an
existing debt that attached at the moment it was conveyed.
1 30
There is, however, strong support that the guaranty should not be
included on the balance sheet.
31
123. M.A. Springman, Fraudulent Conveyances, Fraudulent Preferences, and other
Voidable Transactions, in RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN THE LAW OF CREDITOR AND
DEBTOR 59, 60 (1988).
124. Bankruptcy Act., R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 91 (1985) (Can.). See Springman, supra note
123, at 104-20 (proving fraudulent intent of the debtor).
125. Tay, supra note 121, at 165.
126. Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 2 (1985) (Can.). See Springman, supra note
123, at 92, 159.
127. Springman, supra note 123, at 92.
128. Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 121(2) (1985) (Can.).
129. See Union Bank v. Tyson, 7 W.W.R. 1117,1120 (1915) (B.C.S.C. Can.); Springman,
supra note 123, at 92-93.
130. See Traders Group, Ltd. v. Mason 10 N.S.R.2d 135, 43 D.L.R.3d 76, 95 (1973)
(Can.), varied 10 N.S.R.2d 115, 53 D.L.R.3d 103, 108 (1974) (Can.).
131. Tay, supra note 121, at 150-51.
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4. The Consequences of Canadian Bankruptcy Law
Under Canadian bankruptcy law, it is probable that the
guaranty would not be listed on the balance sheet, and therefore,
under the balance sheet test, the debtor would be more likely to









As illustrated above, if Canadian bankruptcy law is applied,
Cangen may be considered solvent under the balance sheet test.
As in U.K. law, however, there are alternative methods for
determining insolvency under Canadian law. Although Cangen
may pass the "balance sheet test," it may not pass on one of the
other insolvency tests. Thus, Canadian bankruptcy law may allow
recovery, a result that would be in direct conflict with U.S.
bankruptcy law.
V. IMPACT OF THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS IN
VALUATION OF GUARANTIES
As seen above, not all countries treat contingent liabilities
(guaranties) the same as the United States.13 2  According to
some commentators:
United States bankruptcy laws.., would permit foreign subsid-
iaries of United States corporations to file for bankruptcy with
relatively minimal United States contacts and enable United
States bankruptcy courts to assert jurisdiction over all assets of
132. See supra Part IV.B.
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the foreign debtor, wherever located (including property located
outside the United States). Here, the potential for conflict
between United States and foreign bankruptcy laws is great.133
Because the U.K. and Canadian tests for fraudulent transfers
and insolvency differ from those used in the United States, a
corporation in the United Kingdom or Canada may be considered
insolvent even if its assets are greater than its liabilities. Thus,
Engen or Cangen may be considered insolvent if either is unable
to pay their obligations as they become due.14 Also, as indicat-
ed, the Act does not appear to allow recovery of any pre-bank-
ruptcy transfers.
Conversely, in the United States, a "corporation may be
solvent for Bankruptcy Act purposes, even though it is unable to
meet current liabilities, as long as the fair valuation of its assets is
sufficient to meet its debts." '135 This distinction is significant
because in U.S. bankruptcy law one of the prerequisites for deter-
mining a transfer fraudulent is that the debtor must have been
insolvent at the time of the transfer.'36 Not allowing recovery
unless the debtor is insolvent reflects U.S. bankruptcy policy that
debtors should be free to distribute assets as they deem best. Only
after a debtor becomes insolvent will a U.S. bankruptcy court
become concerned that the debtor will favor one creditor over
another, and the policy of equitable treatment of creditors become
effective.
137
U.S. bankruptcy policy can be contrasted with the policies of
the United Kingdom and Canada by considering the impact that
U.S. bankruptcy law will have on the debtor's foreign and
domestic creditors.
A. Impact of Using US. Bankruptcy Standards
There are many reasons why bankruptcy courts may decide to
apply U.S. bankruptcy law in Engen's or Cangen's bankruptcy.
First, pursuant to U.S. bankruptcy policy, Engen and Cangen are
133. Filcs & Ireland, supra note 7, at 416.
134. For instance, companies may become unable to pay their debts as they become
due when their assets are non-liquid (e.g., inventory, lagging accounts receivable, or
machinery and equipment).
135. In re Frigitemp Corp. v. Alpha Assoc., Inc., 34 B.R. 1000, 1005 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983). See also Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 741 (Bankr. 2d Cir. 1958).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. BLUM, supra note 10, at 141.
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not necessarily prohibited from "preferring" one creditor over
another. The bankruptcy court may want to honor Engen's or
Cangen's preference.138  Additionally, despite the principles of
comity and other balancing factors in ancillary proceedings, a large
discrepancy under foreign law that favors foreign creditors may be
disfavored by U.S. bankruptcy courts.
Under U.S. law, several factors affect whether a transaction
will be avoidable. 139 As discussed supra, the way that guaranties
are listed on a balance sheet may determine whether Engen or
Cangen was insolvent at the time of the transfer and, therefore,
whether the transfer was fraudulent and avoidable.1" Under
U.S. bankruptcy standards, the results could be contrary to the
results under foreign bankruptcy practices due to the different
valuations and standards of insolvency.
In determining liabilities on Engen's and Cangen's balance
sheets under U.S. bankruptcy principles, the bankruptcy court
determines, at the time the guaranty was made, the likelihood that
the guaranty would be called by Genbank, and multiplies that
percentage by the total amount of the guaranty. According to
U.S. cases, the percentage determined by corporate insiders is not
conclusive, 4 ' and hindsight may be used.142  For example,
bankruptcy judges may consider subsequent events in valuing
138. Gropper, supra note 3, at 73 ("The U.S. principle is that, generally, an intercompa-
ny claim represents a legitimate debt of one company against the other and is not
automatically subordinated or treated as equity, unless there is some reason to do so.").
139. For example, whether the transaction occurred during the period when Engen or
Cangen is presumed insolvent determines whether the trustee can recover the payment.
In the United States, if the transfer occurs outside the year-long period for insiders, the
trustee will not be able to recover the transfer regardless of whether Engen or Cangen was
insolvent at the time of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This
presumption of insolvency is rebuttable. Therefore, if Genbank, the beneficiary, is able
to prove either Engen or Cangen was solvent at the time the transaction occurred, the
transaction will not be avoidable. The main impact of the presumption is to transfer the
burden of proof to Genbank.
Foreign law may also extend the time the courts allow recovery from transfers from
ninety days in the Untied States to two years in the United Kingdom. See Stephen Gold,
In and Out of Bankruptcy, 137 NEw L.J. 53, 53 (1987). In Canada, the period can extend
to five years, longer'if intent is proven. Tay, supra note 121, at 162-66. Allowing courts
to extend the presumptive period of insolvency is contrary to U.S. bankruptcy policy,
which favors debtors.
140. See supra Part III.
141. Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. In re Sierra Steel, Inc., 96 B.R. 275, 279 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "there is
no policy reason why bankruptcy judges should not be allowed to consider subsequent
events in valuing assets or determining liabilities.").
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assets or determining liabilities. In an insolvency determination,
a bankruptcy judge becomes a statistician in addition to adminis-
tering other judicial responsibilities.
1. U.S. Bankruptcy Law-The U.K. Debtor
U.K. law indicates that the guaranty may not be considered
when calculating Engen's liabilities.143 As a result, under U.K.
bankruptcy law, there is a higher probability that Engen will be
considered solvent because no guaranty value is used as opposed
to U.S. bankruptcy law, where a percentage of the guaranty is
listed. Thus, U.K. bankruptcy policies may be thwarted under U.S.
bankruptcy law because Engen would more likely be found
insolvent if the risk that Pargen would default were higher than
zero percent.
Conversely, if other factors are present, the court may
consider Engen insolvent under U.K. bancruptcy law even if
Engen's assets exceed its liabilities. Therefore, if the court finds
Engen solvent under U.S. law and allows Engen to prefer
Genbank, the result may frustrate U.K. bankruptcy policies.
2. U.S. Bankruptcy Law-The Canadian Debtor
Under Canadian law, recovery is not allowed under the Act.
Not allowing recovery may reflect a Canadian policy of deferring
to large corporations. Conversely, under the BIA, recovery is
allowed and the time periods for recovery are extended.
By filing bankruptcy in the United States, however, Cangen
may take advantage of U.S. court rulings, which allow a guaranty
to be listed as a percentage of the likelihood that Cangen would
be required to pay Pargen's debt.'" Therefore, if Cangen does
not qualify for the Act, it is advantageous for Cangen to file for
bankruptcy in the United States. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, it is
less likely that the transfer could be recovered. Thus, Cangen may
prefer Genbank over other creditors, and Genbank would also
benefit.
Under the BIA, Canadian courts ease the trustee's burden of
proof that a transfer was fraudulent, allowing for a more equitable
distribution of the estate among the creditors. 45  Allowing
143. Id
144. For a discussion of how guaranties are listed see supra Part III.
145. See Tay, supra note 121, at 161-66.
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Cangen to prefer Genbank over another creditor is inconsistent
with Canadian bankruptcy policies.
B. Impact of Using Foreign Bankruptcy Standards in Ancillary
Proceedings
By applying foreign bankruptcy laws in an ancillary proceed-
ing, U.S. bankruptcy courts may allow the trustee to avoid the
transfers that would not be considered fraudulent under U.S.
bankruptcy laws. For instance, since both U.K. and Canadian law
define "insolvency" much more broadly than U.S. law, if their
definition of insolvency is applied, it is more likely the trustee will
avoid a transfer. Thus, the trustee may force Genbank to turn
over assets collected from Engen or Cangen on an intercorporate
guaranty as a fraudulent transfer due to the law chosen by the
bankruptcy court.
Additionally, in ancillary proceedings, if the United States
does not uphold the law of a foreign country, then that foreign
country will probably not apply U.S. bankruptcy law when the
situation is reversed. This factor is not considered under the U.S.
balancing approach to decide which laws apply.
U.S. bankruptcy courts could analogize to U.S. tax cases,
which prohibit the use of other (foreign) accounting methods that
vary from U.S. accounting practices."a  By solely using U.S.
bankruptcy rules, the bankruptcy courts could favor U.S. creditors
and debtors because foreign laws that were unfavorable to U.S.
creditors and debtors would not be applied. Again, however, this
strict rule does not consider the section 304 factors to determine
which law should be applied. 147  Also, U.S. bankruptcy courts
have not been eager to employ tax law principles.14
146. JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 45E.147
(1994) ("Valuation of Assets and Liabilities-Any accounting practice systematically
undervaluing assets or overvaluing liabilities is prohibited; even though allowed or required
under foreign law, except where allowed under United States tax accounting standards.
147. See supra Part III.B.
148. In re Lewiston Steam & Power Assocs., No. B86-00477-Y, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS
1382, at *6-7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that tax cases are considered inappropriate
since recharacterization of loans as capital contributions is outside the court's equitable
powers); In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (9th Cir. 1986).
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1. U.K. Law in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts
By honoring U.K. law, U.S. bankruptcy courts may find that
the guaranty amount may not be listed on Engen's balance sheet.
Without the guaranty on the balance sheet to show that Engen was
insolvent, it would be difficult for the trustee to avoid the transfer
under the "balance sheet test."
The bankruptcy court could still consider, however, whether
Engen is paying its debts as they come due. Thus, even if Engen
is solvent under the "balance sheet test," it may still be considered
insolvent for the purpose of finding a fraudulent transfer.
2. Canadian Law in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts
If Cangen is placed in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings in
Canada at the same time that Cangen files for bankruptcy in the
United States, a foreign representative of the Canadian bankruptcy
may use an ancillary proceeding to request that the U.S. bankrupt-
cy court apply Canadian law. If the U.S. bankruptcy court follows
the Canadian BIA, Cangen may show insolvency at the time of the
transfer, which it could not show under U.S. laws.
As previously noted, if U.S. bankruptcy courts apply the
Canadian Act, no recovery would be allowed.
VI. CONCLUSION
By filing for bankruptcy in the United States, it appears that
Engen or Cangen can take advantage of the U.S. bankruptcy
court's calculation of liabilities because U.S. bankruptcy calcula-
tions differ from Engen's and Cangen's native court's calculations,
as well as U.S. bankruptcy law's shorter time limitations to void
transfers as fraudulent.149 Assuming foreign creditors will have
equal standing in the bankruptcy court, allowing Cangen and
Engen to avoid transfers may be inconsistent with a foreign
country's bankruptcy policy. As previously noted, some foreign
countries favor equitable treatment of creditors, and their policies
are designed to protect and favor creditors unlike the U.S. policy
of giving debtor's a fresh start.
150
149. McQuiston, supra note 2, at 140-72 (providing guidelines for writing an enforceable
guaranty).
150. For a discussion of bankruptcy policies, see supra Part III.A.
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The results under U.K. or Canadian bankruptcy law, however,
are not immutable. Due to the various ways debtors are found
insolvent, courts applying U.K. and Canadian law have different
results, depending on which test the court applies. Because the
varied results do not appear to reflect a "hard" policy of the
legislature, applying U.S. law does not transgress either U.K. or
Canadian policies. Thus, if U.S. bankruptcy courts apply U.S.
bankruptcy law, Engen and Cangen could take advantage of U.S.
bankruptcy rules.
If U.S. courts apply U.S. bankruptcy rules, lenders can protect
themselves from fraudulent transfer liability by obtaining evidence
of the solvency of the primary obligor: the lower the risk, the less
likely the call on the guaranty, the less likely the call, the less the
guaranty will affect the guarantor's balance sheet. The "risk of
call" calculation could be prepared by an independent accountant.
This calculation is preferable to later calculations because it is not
influenced by hindsight. Thus, Genbank could specify the
possibility that Engen and Cangen will be required to pay Pargen's
debt. Although this is not binding on the bankruptcy court, it is
a strong indication of what the actual risks were at the time of the
transaction.
If corporations are concerned about their rights in a subse-
quent bankruptcy, the contracting parties can draft a choice of law
clause.151 Thus, Genbank may specify which country's law a
court should apply in the event Engen or Cangen files for
bankruptcy.
Genbank may also protect itself by obtaining a security
interest in Pargen's assets at the time the guaranty is obtained. A
security interest would give Genbank priority over other creditors
if the interest is perfected.
Ancillary proceedings have additional considerations. On one
hand, if a U.S. bankruptcy court applies foreign bankruptcy law in
an ancillary proceeding, the court may contravene U.S. bankruptcy
policy. On the other hand, it may seem "fair" to foreign creditors
to follow foreign bankruptcy law because the creditors, arguably,
151. See Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington, 788 F. Supp. 1233, 1263 (Bankr.
D.C. 1992) (stating "[tjhe Rules of Civil Procedure do not prevent the Court from
considering the existence of this jurisdictional clause ...."); In re St. Johnsburg Trucking
Co., Inc., 174 B.R. 186, 188 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1994) (using federal choice of law principles to
determine which state law applies to a fraudulent transfer).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
have relied on and assumed that the foreign country's law would
apply. The application of foreign law, however, may be unfair to
U.S. creditors.
The quandary in applying a foreign country's laws is that there
is no horizontal equity. Similarly situated creditors are treated
differently. Although the U.K. and Canadian creditors of Engen
and Cangen are situated similarly to U.S. creditors, the creditors
located in the United Kingdom or Canada are treated differently
from U.S. creditors because different laws apply to the different
entities.
152
In ancillary proceedings, the court will either recognize foreign
law or dismiss the ancillary proceeding, thus applying U.S. law by
default.53 U.S. bankruptcy rules will likely be used in ancillary
proceedings for several reasons. First, bankruptcy courts will tend
to be protective of domestic concerns." Second, bankruptcy
courts will seek to prevent fraudulent transfers.' 5 Third, U.S.
bankruptcy courts better understand of domestic laws and are
familiar with avoiding fraudulent transfers as defined by U.S.
standards.
156
Another consideration when applying U.S. law in ancillary
proceedings is the equitable treatment of creditors. If U.S. laws
automatically apply to all bankruptcies filed in the United States,
once Engen and Cangen file for bankruptcy in the United States,
Engen's and Cangen's creditors will know U.S. law applies and
that the law applies to each creditor equally. By applying U.S.
laws, the U.S. bankruptcy court and Engen's and Cangen's
creditors save time and money. It is not necessary for the parties
to litigate the choice of law issue.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, foreign creditors are
treated fairly if U.S. bankruptcy courts apply U.S. bankruptcy rules
in a foreign debtor's U.S. bankruptcy. If all parties are aware that
U.S. bankruptcy law applies if the debtor subsequently files for
bankruptcy in the United States, the creditor may protect itself in
advance.
152. See supra Part III.
153. Westbrook, supra note 11, at 37.
154. DALHUISEN, supra note 13, at 3-405.
155. Id. at 3-411.
156. Id. at 3-420.
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By allowing less than the full amount of the guaranty on the
balance sheet, U.S. bankruptcy courts promote the policy of
honoring the debtor's preferences. One problem with listing less
than the full amount of the guaranty on the balance sheet is
determining what value is appropriate. U.S. bankruptcy courts are
also attempting to come to terms with ascertaining the proper
statistic. Currently, U.S. bankruptcy courts do not allow insiders
of the debtor to have input into the calculations of the probabili-
ties after the fact. One solution could be to allow financial experts
to determine the likelihood that the guarantor would be required
to pay the amount guarantied. A calculation done by a third party
would eliminate some of the current subjectivity from the
calculation. Also, as mentioned, the parties may calculate the
probabilities objectively at the time the guaranty is given and
include that calculation in the contract. This calculation has
greater objectivity and is not influenced by hindsight and, there-
fore, may have more weight with the court.
Applying U.S. bankruptcy law in all U.S. bankruptcy cases,
including ancillary proceedings, and integrating an objective
calculation of the probability that the debtor will be required to
pay the guaranty calculated at the time the guaranty is given is
practical and fair to all parties.
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